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INTROOOCTION
~cline

in the growth rate of worker productivity as well as the

failure of other types of organizational development strategies to
improve productivity has resulted in considerable interest in
s rategies to change employee behavior.

This situation has led to the

rapid growth of organizational behavior modification (OBM) as an
approach o organizational change .

Performance feedback interventions

have been used in numerous settings to improve work behaviors
(Prue & Fairbanks, 1981).
saf

OBM has worked especially well in improving

work behavior in the work place.

However, when new approaches

are used in dealing with human behavior, much systematic, thorough
research must be conducted to ascertain the benefits of the components
of

ha

approach.

measurement

OBM has basically four components:

feedback, and reinforcement.

the component of feedback.

observation,

The focus of this study is

Many studies, which will be discussed in

more detail later, have dealt with feedback in conjunction with other
factors, such as supervisory praise, training, and goal-setting.
These other factors have confounded the value of feedback.

Therefore,

the purpose of this study is to ascertain the value of feedback to
OBM.
Behavior M:xiification principles are relatively simple.
B. F. Skinner is thought of as the father of this approach.
evolved from an approach known as operant conditioning.

His view

'Illis approach
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places emphasis on overt , observable behaviors instead of inferred
motives or hypothesized needs.

1he pr inciples of operant conditioning

state that an individual is shaped by condit ions in the environment.
Usually, as the conditions change, the behavior changes.

Similarly,

the Skinnerian viewpoint states that in the enVironmefrr, there are
antecedents which influence in:iividuals t o behave in a certain manner.
'Ihis behavior has certain consequences which det ermine whether the
behavior will be likely to occur in the future .

For example, if a

worker has an extremely heavy work load (antecedent), he then responds
to this situation by working very fast and ef ficient ly (behavior).
This worker's supervisor recognizes the extra effort and commends the
VK)rker on the job wel 1 done (consequences) .

This consequence was

positive; therefore, the likelihood of that response occurri ng in the
future is increased.

As evidenced in this example , behavior

modification adapts to the work place well.

Ski nner himself consulted

with Emery Air Freight to improve performance (Feeney , 1972).

By

observing the work place to pinpoint antecedent s , then measuring
actual employee behaviors, managers were able t o distribute effective
consequences, which were feedback and re inforcement.

The results

showed the behavior improved dras t ically and t he company saved
thousands of dollars annually.
There are many advantages t o using perf ormance feedback
interventions in t he work place .

First , these interventions are

inexpensive to linplement relat ive t o ot her pr oductivity-enhancement
techniques (Feeney , 1972).

Second, perf ormance feedback programs
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are simple t o implement since prolonged, cumbersome, and
sophisticated training programs are seldan required.

'Ihird, feedback

interventions often decrease the use of unprogrammed aversive control
procedures which are the typical contingency arrangements found within
organizations.
comments of

Informal ohservations of the overt behavior and verbal

~rkers

during feedback interventions suggest that

{X)Sitive control over behavior increases and aversive control
decreases following implementation of performance feedback programs
(Kanaki, Barwick, & Scott, 1978).

Finally, feedback interventions are

attractive in organizations that may not have access to other
intervention strategies.

For example, many organizations find the

range of programmable reinf orcers restricted by factors such as union
constraints UJX)n the use of monetary incentives or rewards for
incr ased productivity.
A primary concern of organizations is to ensure the safety and
health of the organization's employees.

The problem of industrial

acciden s is still JX)Orly understood and resistant to solution.
Historically, many studies focused on the relationship between
accidents arrl factors that are, from the standinint of management,
difficult to alter, for example, age, experience level, and
personality characteristics of the work force.
~uld

Also, these studies

only record measurements before and after the interventions.

A cause-effect conclusion could not be made.

Finally, the

measurements taken were usually accident reports or possibly only
lost-time accidents (Crawford, 1960, 09.vids & Mahoney, 1957,
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Verhaegen, Vanhalst, Cerijcke, & VanHoecke, 1976).

These happenings

occur rarely, only t\\O to three times per month in some settings.
~asurements

of human behavior need to be taken of ten because human

behavior, namely, safe work behavior, has high variability; and,
therefore, frequent measurements would yield more valid results.
There have been many studies conducted in recent years utilizing
OBM principles to improve safety.

Sulzer-Azaroff and

[',e

Santamaria

(1980) id n ified hazardous conditions in the physical surroundings
such as spills not cleaned irrrnediately, guard rails in disrepair,
and then posted observational measures (feedback) around a
manufac uring plant.
in the plant.

This feedback was sufficient to reduce hazards

In a study by Haynes, Pine, and Fitch (1982), vehicle

accidents were reduced among urban transit operators by use of
fe dback, incentives, and competition, but the components were
confounded.

Finally, Zahar, C.Ohen, and Azar (1980) used feedback

plus token economies to improve safe work behavior.
Opponents of OBM state that OBM is not simple, original, or
consistent (Locke, 1980).

Cbal-setting theorists explain results of

behavior mcx:lif ication studies by rationalizing that it is not feedback
but the goal-setting component that motivates subjects to improve
behavior (Locke, 1978).

Locke, Cartledge, and Koeppel (1968) have

argued that studies have shown that feedback alone is not sufficient
to change behavior.

The studies this author cites, though, are not

methodologically sound or industrially-based.

Cbal-setting theorists

contend that it is not instinct or environment, but cognitive
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processes inside human beings that mot i vat e people to achieve their
goals arrl improve behavior (Locke, 1977) .

Goal-setting theorists

argue that behaviorists ignore these cognitions and, in effect,
that the rationale for OBM is completely wrong.
In argument, though, principles in OBM s t at e that cognitions do
exist; but there is no way to outwardly measure these cognitions.
Behaviors can be measured and antecedents can be controlled;
therefore

it is only logical to manipulate these components.

Also,

OBM principles state that a criterion should be set (goal-set ting)
to determine when to reinforce (Kazdin, 1980) .

To date, there has

been no proper comµ:ment analysis to determine i f simple feedback,
without specified criteria, will improve behavior.

Also , i t has not

been determined to what degree the added component of goal-setting
will improve behavior.

'Ih se issues have been addressed in t-w:> major studi es that
relate directly to the study being proposed (Komaki, Barwick , & Scott,
1978; and Kornaki, Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980 ) , and ooth are concerned
with occupational safety.
manufacturing plant.

The first study took place at a food

This study, in behavioral ter ms, defined which

behaviors constituted safe work behavior s.

Behavi ors were emphasized

instead of the vague terms normally used, such as ''be careful" and
"less rushed" which were the standard practice previous to this study.
Investigation showed that these behaviors were hardly ever rewarded or
even recognized.

'Ille l ogic used here is if one could increase safe

wor k perfor mance by reinfor cement , then accidents, which are an
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outcome of unsafe work behavior, would decrease.

In this study,

workers from the plant were given an explanation and visual
presentation of the desired behaviors .

Trained raters observed

employees' behavior and documented how many safe work behaviors were
observed and how many unsafe work behaviors were observed.

A graph

was then i;x:>sted after every observation which gave the percentage of
time safe WJrk performance was observed.
for improvements.

Employees in the

tWJ

Supervisory praise was given
departments substantially

improved their safety performance from 70% and 78% to 96 % and 99%,
respectively.

Dwring reversal phase, performance returned to baseline

(71 % and 72%).

It should be noted that praise (verbal reinforcement)

and goal-setting were used in the intervention in conjunction with
feedback and, therefore, the value of feedback was confounded by the
o her components.
The second study, Komaki, Heinzmann, and Lawson (1980), was
conducted tWJ years later in a vehicle maintenance department for a
large city.
former study.

This study was designed in a very similar manner to the
Training was separated from feedback and goal-setting

to see which variable provided the most improvement.

A multiple-

baseline design with a reversal comi;x:>nent was used in which five
conditions were introduced:

(a) Baseline, (b) Training Only 1,

Cc) Training and Feedback 1, (d) Training Only 2, and Ce) Training and
Feedback 2.

It was concluded that training alone was not a sufficient

means of improving and maintaining performance.

Here again, goal-

setting and supervisory praise was used in conjunction with feedback.
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In a study by Reber and Wallin (1984), it was demonstrated that
training plus goal-setting plus feedback was the optimum setting for
improving safe work performance at a farm machinery manufacturing
plant.

With the addition of one factor, the performance was improved.

Two factors resulted in more improvement, and finally, feedback,

the third factor, provided even more improvement.

However, the effect

of feedback was confounded by the first tv-D factors of training and
goal-set ing

thus the value of feedback by itself was never computed.

Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor (1979) have thoroughly reviewed the
literature on feedback.

They state that feedback about effectiveness

of an individual's behavior has long been recognized as essential for
1 arning rmd for motivation in performance-oriented organizations.

The understanding of feedback effects in ongoing work organizations is
hampered by a lack of corrmunications between the integration of human
performance ar.d the motivation orientations toward feedback.

This

review pointed out the weakness of l.ocke's seminal work in goalsetting.

Locke's focus was primarily on goals, not feedback, and,

therefore, concentrated exclusively on goal-relevant aspects of
feedback.

Emphasis should be placed on all aspects of feedback,

namely the effect of feedback isolated from other factors.

Also,

Ilgen et al. identified a need to establish whether specificity
of the feedback is an important issue, especially where goals are
presented in conjunction with feedback.
This study proposed to establish what effect feedback had on
improving safe work behaviors.

A multiple-baseline design was used
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with the first phase being the baseline measur es .

The second phase of

the study was isolation of feedback with no s t a t ed goals.

It was

hy'(X)thesized that safety performance YK>uld improve during this phase.
The third phase was the introduction of mcxlerately -diff icult goals
that were mutually set, to ascertain how much improvement there was in
the feedback-only phase (second phase) as compared t o
feedback-plus-goal-setting phase (third phase) .
tha

It was hypothesized

safety performance would improve even more during t his third

phas .

'Ihe fourth phase was total reversal phase wher e all components

were withdrawn.

It was hy'(X)thesized that safety performance would

eturn to baseline or near-baseline level.

Final ly, the fifth phase

was the reintroduction of the feedback-only phase .

It was

hy'(X)th sized that safety performance would improve agai n.
it was established
of the f edback

Secondly ,

through analysis of variance, whether specificity

in regards to irrlividual versus group f eedback , was

an im'(X)rtant canµ:ment in improving safe behavior s.

It was

hy'(X)thesized that individual and truck feedback groups would have
similar improvement and that the group feedback group would be
different from these two groups.

METHOD
Setting and Subjects
This study was conducted in the Bureau of Refuse Collection of a
medium-sized southern city's department of public works.

'Ihe bureau

had one of the highest accident rates in the city, recording almost
15 claims per month per 100 employees.

'Ihis figure was well above the

average rates for refuse collection workers in the nation (N:ltional
Safety C.ouncil, 1983) .

'Ille individual in charge of Risk Management

and Training of the city selected the :&rreau of Refuse C.Ollection
because there had been recent concern expressed by city officials to
decrease lost-time accidents arrong city employees.
nature of

Also, the very

he job of refuse collection worker was very hazardous, plus

the high accident rate relative to other bureaus within the city
contributed to the decision.
The Bureau of Refuse C.ollection is responsible for the
collection and disposition of all commercial and residential refuse
within the city limits.

The section that is responsible for the

commercial routes services businesses and large establishments where
metal garbage containers are used.
one driver and one 'helper."

On these routes, there is usually

'Ihe section that is responsible for

residential routes mainly services curb-side pick-up from private
residences.

On these routes, there is one driver and tm "taters"

for each truck.
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The subjects that were chosen for this study are the taters
that service the residential routes.

An examinat ion of past accident

r eports showed that the taters accounted for a l ar ge portion of the
cl aims wit hi n the bureau.

Subject consent (See Appendix A) was

obtai ned during an orientation meeting where the study was explained
ver bally to t he subjects.

Written consent was then obtained by the

signing of an individual consent form which outlined t he purix>se and
condi ions of the s t udy.
1 female .

'Ihere were 30 subjects, 29 males and

Their mean age was 32.5 years old, and the mean experience

level was 5 years.
$1 . 00 per hour more

The median pay rate was $6. 23 per hour , which was
han other city laborers .

10-hour days with weekends arrl Wednesdays off.

Employees worked four
They worked on what is

r ferred as a "task f orce ," where, regardless of when their work was
completed

they were paid t he full 10 hours.

For example , i f a crew

was finished in 8 hours , they were paid for a 10-hour day.
Behavioral Analys i s
A preliminary assessment of the antecedent s and consequences of
behavior was conducted to determine fact or s that led t o unsafe work
behaviors.

At the onset of the study, the t ask f orce method for the

everyday work period reinforced the rapid , care l ess manner of the
taters.

For instance, if the toter violated some safe work standards

and reduced the total work hours, he/she was rewarded at the end of
the day because he/she left work earl y .

Theref ore, that employee was

likely to violate more safe \.\'Or k s t andards in the future.
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Observation also irrlicated that even When an employee was working
safely, he/she was rarely rewarded for doing so.
There were safety posters arrl reminders in t he employee
breakroom.

A safety meeting was held for al l employees every month

where various topics were discussed, but there was no formal safety
training provided to new employees.
~asure

To generate specific, essential safe work behaviors, accident
reports were examined from the past three years.
were obtained from these reports.

Prevent ive behaviors

Observation of the Y.Drkers and

consultation with the supervisors also provided information that
help d generate this observational checklist.

1ne checklist behaviors

are behaviors that, when performed, Y.Duld dimi nish the chance of an
accident.

For instance, some behaviors were ' 'wear cl ot h gloves at all

times," ''bend knees when picking up boxes , shrubs , et c .".

(The

complete Behavioral Oi.ecklist is provided i n Appendix B.)
'IWo trained raters served as nonpart icipant observers.

There was

one main rater, with an additional r ater brought in to obtain
inter-rater reliability .

Each item on t he checklist was coded as

safe, unsafe, or unobserved .

The percent age of total observed safe

Y.Drk performance was cal cul ated as t he number of safe items divided by
the total number of items observed , unsafe plus safe, and multiplied
by 100.

Each observation lasted f or a t otal of 30 minutes.

Observations t ook place f our days per week with four observations
per day.

The raters f ound t he particular trucks on which the subjects
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worked and observed the toters in the res i dential areas.

'Ihe

observers followed the trucks in their own personal car, and the
subjects knew they were being observed .

'Ihe exact t imes of

observation varied; no observation was carri ed out at the same t ime of
day on any tv.;o consecutive days .
A total of 300 observations was conducted over a 12-week period

of time.

Inter-rater reliability was asses sed 30 times , for an

average of one reliability check every 10 observations.

'Ihis was done

by having a second observer accompany the primary observer.

Both

observers observed the same subject simultaneously, h.It independently.
A percentage agreement method was used in which the number of
agreements was divided by the number of agreements plus disagreements
and mul iplied by 100.
groups.

Reliability averaged 79 . 6% agreement for all

Reliability suffered somewhat because the pr imary observer

was required to observe arrl drive the car that was following the
truck.

The secondary observer was merely required to observe the

subjects.

A higher average could have been obtained if bot h observers

were required to drive arrl observe .

When this was done at the end of

the study, the reliability checks had a much higher agreement of
83.4%.

Simple economical restrictions hampered this method from being

used for the entire duration of the study.
~sign

and Procedures

A multiple-basel i ne des ign wit h a r eversal component was employed
with a total of five phases:

Base line , which lasted tv.a weeks;

Feedback Only 1, whi ch las ted tID weeks; Feedback and Coal-setting,

13

which lasted tWJ weeks; tb Feedback--NJ Cbal-setting, which lasted tWJ
weeks; and Feedback Only 2, which lasted tID weeks.
The 30 subjects were randomly assigned to three different groups.
'Ihe first group of 10 people received individual feedback immediately
following each observation.

The main rater handed the irrlividual

subject his/her individual graph with his/her individual performance
plott d on the graph .
necessary

b..i

The rater was available to answer questions if

no encouragement or verbal reinforcement was given.

The second group of 10 people received feedback for their individual
trucks (two people per each feedback report) and feedback was
distributed in the same manner as the individual feedback.

The third

group of 10 people received feedback for that entire group, and
after all 10 subjects were observed feedback was given in the form
of a poster posted by the time clock; the main rater stood close
o the pos er every morning to answer questions for these subjects
also.

The phases started and stopped at various times for each group;

therefore, when safety performance changed only when the intervention
was implemented, one could rule out alternative plausible hyp::>theses
with much greater confidence.
The feedback was given in the form of a plotted graph on white
JX)ster board, 3 ft. x 2 1/2 ft., or 8 1/2 in. x 11 in. white paper,
depending on the type of group .

Also, the behavioral checklist was

provided in the first week of the Feedback Only 1 Phase.

'Ihe graph

was posted six inches away from the time clock for the group that
received group feedback.

For the irrlividual and truck feedback,
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the subjects received feedback privately and individually.
Immediately after each observation, a new point was placed on the
graph.

Ulring the goal-setting phases, a dotted line was drawn on the

graph to in::licate the specified goals.

Cbals were mutually set by the

main rater and the subject(s) at the time of feedback distribution.
'Ihe rater suggested 10- 20% increase as a goal, but input from the
subjects was a requirement.

RESULTS
Data were collected for 30 subjects with 10 observations per
subject for a total of 300 observations over a 12-week period of time.
Figure 1 shows the mean percentage of safe performance for each type
of feedback across each week during the observation sessions.

Summary

data for the three different types of feedback are presented in
Table 1 and Figure 2.
Analysis of Variance
The research design implemented three levels for types of
f edback
weeks.

five levels for phases (treatments) and tv;o levels for
'Ill.is created a 3 x 5 x 2 repeated measures analysis of

variance that was appropriate for testing the hyµ:>theses.

The result

was a highly significant main effect for phase of the study
(F(4, 108) = 58. 33, p ( .001), but no main effect for type of feedback
(F(2, 27)

=

.11, p ).05).

There was also a significant interaction

term for tyP= of feedback and phase of the study (F(8, 108) =
2. 3 7 ' p

< .05 ) .

In a planned comparison, there was no difference between truck
and group feedback (F(4, 108) = . 29, p ) .05).

W"ien these tm

types of feedback were combined and then contrasted with individual
feedback, there was a significant contrast (F(4, 108) =
4. 45' p

< .01 ) .
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Figure 1 :

Mean Percentage of Safety Performance for Each Type
of Feedback .
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TABLE 1
MEAN PERCENTAGE OF SAFETY PERFORMANCE FOR EACH PHASE

PHASE

INDIVIOOAL

TRUCK

GROUP

OVERALL

Bas line

.55

.59

.60

.58

F ed back Only 1

.66

.68

. 70

.68

Feedback and Cbal- setting

. 79

. 74

. 73

. 75

Reversal

.68

.66

.6 7

.6 7

Feedback Only 2

. 73

.69

. 72

. 71

NJte.

Percentage of Safe Performance =

safe behaviors observed
total observed behaviors

18
Overall

80
75
70
65
60
55
0
Indivi ua
Q)

en
co
..c
~

...c
u

~

80
75
70
65
60
55

H

0

Q)

u

c

co

E

H

0

H

Q)
~

True

80
75
70 65
60
55-

Q)

4-1

co

Cl)
~

0

<1)

00

co
c
<1)
u
H

<1)

°""

0Group

80 7570 65 -

60 55 0True

Group

807570656055-

0Phases
Figure 2:

~an

Percentage of Safety Performance for Each Phase
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A quadratic trend was tested because it was hyp:>thesized that
performance would increase, then decrease during reversal.

A cubic

trend was tested because it was hyinthesized that performance would
increase, then decrease, and f:inally increase again after
reintroduction of Feedback .

A trend analysis for phase of the study

was conducted and the results are shown in Table 2.
Subjects' Reactions
Although subject responses were not formally questioned, informal
observation irrlicated favorable reactions.

l'-bst of the subjects were

anxious to know how they were doing even before baseline data
collection was complete.

The interaction between the subjects and

the observers was quite friendly.
DJ.ring the course of the study, no complaints were expressed
about

he presence of the observers.

This was surprising because

As a

having an automobile follow the truck is somewhat bothersome.
matter of fact, the toters were quite helpful in informing the

observer the streets that were next or when the truck would be backing
up.
It also appeared that canpetition among subjects had little
effect on the subjects.

Since feedback was given individually and

privately, little opp:>rtunity for comparison was available.

When

questioned whether they were competing with fellow subjects, the
subjects stated they were not.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY DATA FOR TREND ANALYSIS F(1, 27)

TYPE OF FEEDBACK

LINEAR

QUADRATIC

ClJBIC

Ov rall

61.08-H'*

54.06***

44.39***

Individual

40.86***

30.37***

14.53**

Group and Truck

25. 51 "'-*'\-

26.09"~

29 .86i-.**

Individual vs. Group and Truck

5.31*

Irrlividual vs. Group and Truck
(Phase 1-3)

9.52**

Group and Truck (Phase 1-3 )

65. 55m\-

Individual (Phase 3-4)

49. 45"'-*

Group and Truck (Phase 3-4)

40. 16*"~

Overall (Phase 1-2)

55.45***

Individual vs. Group and Truck
(Phase 1-2)

l'bte.
*"k-;\-

-;\-*

*
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Overall = observations swnmed across groups.

< .00 1
< .01
p < .05

p
p

2.40

1. 72
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Accident Data
DJring the middle of the study, a city-wide safety education and
incentive program was implemented.

To isolate the effects of this

program, accident reports for the entire bureau were examined and then
compared with accident reports for the toters alone.
The total incidence rate for the entire bureau in 1984 was 176. 15
injuries per 100 employees.
injur

s during 1984, but they only accounted for 24.6% of the

i:npulation within the bureau.
study

The toters accounted for 42.3% of the

DJring the three-month period of the

the toters reduced the percentage to 33% of the injuries.

An ob ained chi square of 3.92 (df

= 1, p

<.05)

illustrated that

frequency of accident reports for toters was significantly different
from

he rest of the employees in the bureau.

DISCUSSION
1he results of this study illustrate the imp::>rtance of feedback
in improving safe work behaviors.

1he linear trend analysis

demonstrated that there was a significant difference between Baseline
and Feedback Only 1 phases for all types of feedback.

D.rring Feedback

Only 1 there was improvement of safe work behaviors.

The theoretical

implications would suggest that, contrary to Locke's statements
(Locke, 1978), feedback isolated from all other factors was
reinforcing for all subjects .

Also, Hawthorne effects can be ruled

out because safe performance decreased during reversal.
1he linear trend analysis also demonstrated that Feedback and
Cbal-setting was the optirm.un condition for improving behaviors.

This

coincides with OBM literature that states that feedback used with a
specified criterion will warrant the best improvement.

Therefore,

the results of this study would indicate that behavioral safety
programs should contain l::xJth components.
The percentage of safe behaviors did not return fully to baseline
level during the reversal phase.
could be that the

t~-week

One explanation for this occurrence

period was not sufficient time for the

behaviors to stabilize in reversal.

The progression was downward and

there was every indication that behaviors would have reached baseline
level if the fifth phase had not been implemented.
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In any event, the
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safe behaviors did decline once the com-pJnents were removed,
indicating the effects of these com-pJnents.
'Ihe second issue addressed in the study was the imi:nrtance of
specificity of feedback.

'Ihe method of distributing feedback was

slightly different for the group feedback condition because it was not
irrmediate.

As the planned canparison illustrated, though, there was

no difference between truck and group feedback; therefore, immediacy
was no

an im{X)rtant condition in this situation.

Group and truck

feedback were treated as the same category throughout the remaining
analyses.

'Ihe planned comparisons showed that individual feedback was

significantly different than truck and group feedback.

The individual

feedback group had the lower mean percentage during baseline but had
he higher mean percentage during the Feedback and Goal-setting phase.
'Ihis chang

v.uuld suggest that the subjects were more affected by

these com{X)n nts.

Interestingly, once one additional person was added

to Feedback and Goal -setting conditions, there might as well have been
10 people receiving this same treatment.

'Illis fact would answer some

of the questions raised by Ilgen et al. (1979).

There was improvement

in the group Feedback and Goal-setting phases, but individual feedback
is more effective when dealing with these comi:nnents.
One aspect of specificity of feedback that was not addressed in
this study is how minute feedback can be and still be meaningful.
For instance, in this study a simple percentage was given as feedback.
Some subjects expressed a desire to know what specific behaviors they
were performing badly.

'Ihe percentage did not give them this
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information.

Future studies might canpare different degrees of

feedback, such as feedback given as a percentage, feedback given for
specific behaviors performed badly and a percentage of total safe
performance, or even feedback that tells specifically how many times
each behavior was performed safely and how many times it was performed
unsafely.
Since the ohservers were not blind to the manipulations of the
study, some of the results may be due to expectancy effects.
repor

Accident

data are an unbiased dependent measure that were changed during

intervention · therefore, expectancy effects might be ruled out.

The

only method definitely to ascertain whether expectancy effects biased
the results would be to replicate the study with completely blind
obs r¥ rs .
Recorrmendations to the irrlividual in charge of Risk M:i.nagement
and Training were made at the conclusion of this study.

As mentioned

by Feeney (1972), performance interventions are inexpensive to
implement into the work place.

The procedure could be carried out by

the supervisors within the bureau.

TI-te supervisors are required as

part of daily routine to find the employees working the routes to
assess progress of the day.
this point of the day.

The safety evaluation could take place at

Very little training VK)Uld be required.

Supervisory praise was not a component in this study, but this
comJX)nent could add to the effects of feedback and goal - setting.
Finally, another suggestion advocated converting the entire bureau
to utilizing a behavioral safety program similar to this study.

This
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~uld

require some additional effort, h.It would probably show

improvement throughout the bureau.

APPENDIX A
INDIVIIlJAL CONSENT SHEET
I agree to be involved in the study being carried out by
Jeanine Williamson of the University of Central Florida.

I llllderstand

that this s udy will be concerned with improving safety.

I understand

that observers will be watching me

~rk

once per week for 10 weeks.

I will also receive feedback on my performance.

I understand that my

individual performance will not be told to my superiors.

I understand

that I can refuse to participate even after the study has started.

Signature
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APPENDIX B

BEHAVIORAL CHECKLIST
Safe

Unsafe
1.

~ars

2.

Wears ''bump'' cap

3.

l'b more than 3 ft. from truck
when throwing bags in

4.

Bends knees when picking up
bags' ooxes' and shrubs

5.

Stands beside the truck when
blade is in operation

6.

Steps down from truck one foot
at a time

7.

Checks traffic before stepping
off truck

8.

Looks forward when the truck
is moving

9.

Bends knees when going over
bwnps, use as shock absorbers

10.

Uses both hands to hold onto
bar when truck is moving

11.

Steps off truck before picking
up bag

12.

Fills hopper only 3/4 full

13.

Wears eye protection

14.

Gives hand signals to driver
when turning and backing; signals
other cars

cloth gloves
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